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Abstract
Scale eﬀect of city size and cost advantage of railway over automo-
biles are examined in a simple park-and-ride commuter system. The
main results are:
• The unit fare charged by a monopoly railway ﬁrm is irrelevant to
the city size.
• The unit fare in a symmetric equilibrium under monopolistic
competition is decreasing in the city size.
• T h eu n i tf a r ei nas y m m e t r i cz e r o - p r o ﬁt kinked equilibrium is
increasing in the city size.
• The unit fare in the social optimum is decreasing in the city size.
• The operation constraints are relaxed in a larger city.
1 Introduction
From the view point of global environmental issues (e.g., reduction of CO2,
NOx or so), it is urgent to save energy in transport sector as well. There
have been several ways proposed for saving energy in urban transportation,
such as congestion tax on automobile, utilization of light rail in down towns,
introduction of ITS technology for improving eﬃciency of transport energy,
and development of battery cars. One of those classic proposals is so-called
”park-and-ride” system that we use automobiles from houses to railway
station nearby and transfer to railways to CBD, that is, working places. By
this way, the private use of automobiles should be reduced so that congestion
as well as negative externality for environment in and around downtown
would be improved much.
In fact, they sometimes try to facilitate parking lots with reasonable
charge around railway stations in suburban areas in several countries. How-
ever, it seems that the system is employed in very limited number of stations
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1and there should be much room we could introduce the system for the pur-
pose above.
In the literature of urban economics, there is a stream on related issues
of railway competition (see Kanemoto 1984 among others), yet it lacked for
the environmental view point. While transportation engineers argued the
importance of such system, policy implication of the system has not been
derived enough from economic point of view.
In this paper, we will develop a simple model of park-and-ride system
in urban setting. That is, we suppose a monocentric city where several rail-
ways start from a single CBD to suburb area spoke-wise, and households use
automobiles ﬁrst from each own house to nearest railway station circumfer-
entially where they transfer to railways bound for CBD, or they may choose
to ride private cars directly through to CBD . Hence, there are competi-
tions between railways as well as between railway and automobiles in this
model. Since direct commuting by automobiles works as ”outside good” in
monopolistic competition among railways those are diﬀerentiated in loca-
tion or space, we follow the model by Salop (1979) that analyses the work
of outside good in horizontally diﬀerentiated market and obtains perverse
characteristics due to the introduction of kinked demand curve.
In this paper, moreover, we focus in scale eﬀects of city size and cost
advantage of railway over automobiles. Our main results are as follows:
The fare per mile charged by a monopoly railway ﬁrm may not be relevant
to the city size; the fare in a symmetric equilibrium under monopolistic
competition is decreasing with the city size; the fare in a symmetric zero-
proﬁt kinked equilibrium is increasing with the city size; the fare of social
optimum is decreasing with the city size.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model
and presents the results with market competition. Social optimum is exam-
ined in Section 3 followed by Concluding Remarks in Section 4.
2M o d e l
2.1 Basic Structure
Spatial conﬁguration of the city
The radius of the city considered is denoted by m. The cetral business
district, so-called CBD, is assumed as a point for simplicity. The distance
from the CBD is denoted by x. Each household lives in a unit interval
circumfentially. The number of households on the concentric circle at x is
2πx.
Total population or the number of households (let us asume each house-




xdx = πρm2 (1)
where ρ denotes population density as a constant. That is, we assume
each household consumes same space of land here.
Each household commutes to an oﬃce at CBD everyday, when she chooses
to use solely an automobile or the combination of automobile and railway
(i.e., park-and-ride system) as a commute vehicle.
Automobile
It is asuumed that roads radiate from CBD in all directions. In other
words, each household could drive to her oﬃce radially from any residence
in the city. This seems so simpliﬁed, yet it is for contrasting the charac-
teristics of automobile and railway. The cost function of automobile from a
residential lot at x is given as
C(x)=cxα (2)
where α > 0 stands for a distance elasticity of the cost of driving automo-
biles. If α > 1, marginal cost of automobile increases as one drives for a
longer distance. It is either because a higher heat makes the engine less
eﬃcient or because a longer driving makes the driver less comfortable.
One-way transportation cost facing to a household who lives at x and
uses solely an automobile is cxα. If all households the city use solely auto-
mobiles, the total transportation costs are 2πc
R m
0 xαdx =2 π c
α+1mα+1.
Railway
A railway radiates from CBD in a direction, if exists. The marginal cost
is constant and normalized to zero. A ﬁxed cost F>0 is required for laying
one unit of railway.
The railway fare for passing through x is denoted by p(x).T h ec u m u l a -
tive railway fare from CBD to a station at x is given by Px ≡
R x
0 p(x)dx.
If there is a station at x from CBD, households residing at x in any
directions from CBD can use the park-and-ride system.
A household who lives at x from CBD and apart from the station by
y drives circumfentially from her lot to the station, and switches to the
railway. The park-and-ride transportation cost of the agent is C(y)+Px.
She will use the park-and-ride system if and only if
C(y)+Px ≤ C(x). (3)
2.2 Monopoly
Suppose that n railway ﬁrms operate in the city yet each market is not
overlapped. Let us call this phase as monopoly. In this subsection, we
focus on this situation while each railway ﬁrm in the city lays railroads to z
(1 ≤ z ≤ m).
3Proposition 1 For any x within z, (i) the ratio of the railway fare to the
automobile cost is α/(1 +α), and (ii) the share of the park-and-ride system
is 1/π(1 + α)
1
α.
Proof. A marginal consumer at x, yx, is characterized by
cyα
x + Px = cxα.
The demand for railway at x is given by
dM








Maximization problem for the monopoly is formalized as





x − zF, (5)
subject to (4).

























The share of park-and-ride system of each ﬁrm is
dM
x /2πx =1 /π(1 + α)
1
α. (9)
Equation (6) states that the fare charged by a monopoly railway ﬁrm is a
fraction α/(1+α) of the transportation cost of automobiles, ckα.T h eg r e a t e r
α, the greater the cost advantage of monopolist, and the higher the fare is.
Equation (9) states that the share of park-and-ride system is constant for
any x, and decreasing in α. Note that it is implicitly assumed here that the
maximized proﬁto faﬁrm is nonnegative, or we assume suﬃciently small F
to guarantee for it.
4Lemma 2 Under monopoly, the unit fare is constant if and only if the
transportation cost of automobiles is linear, i.e., α =1 . The unit fare is
given by p = c/2.
Proof. The lemma follows immediately from equation (7).
Lemma 3 If a monopoly ﬁrm lays railways to z and gains positive proﬁts,
then it has an incentive to extend the railway to z + ∆z.




α cG(z) − F
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The ﬁrm operates if and only if ΠM(z) ≥ 0,i . e . ,
F ≤ 2α(1 + α)−1+α
α cG(z). (10)
The net return from extending the line to the next circle is
ΠM(z + ∆z) − ΠM(z)=2 α(1 + α)−1+α
α c(z + ∆z)α+1 − F
≥ 2α(1 + α)−1+α
α c
£
(z + ∆z)α+1 − G(z)
¤
.
The inequality comes from equation (10). It follows that (z +∆z)α+1 >
G(z) because xα+1 is convex. Therefore, ΠM(z + ∆z) > ΠM(z).
Lemma 2 says that a monopoly railway ﬁrm will extend the line to the
edge of the city, if it is proﬁtable. The next lemma follows immediately.
Lemma 4 Railway ﬁrms operates in the city if
F ≤ 2α(1 + α)−1+α
α cG(m) ≡ ¯ FM. (11)
The maximum number of proﬁtable monopolists is nM = π(1+α)
1
α if we do
not care about integer characteristic of number of ﬁrms.
2.3 Competition among railway ﬁrms
Suppose that n railway ﬁrms operate in the city and that each market is
overlapped. In short run, the number of ﬁrms is supposed to be ﬁxed. Let
us call this phase monopolistic competition.
5Proposition 5 In a symmetric equilibrium under monopolistic competition
among railways, (i) the ratio of the railway fare to the automobile cost is
2α(π/n)α.( i i )I fα =1 , then the unit fare is constant at 2πc/n.
Proof. Suppose that the neighboring ﬁrms charge ¯ Px.A m a r g i n a l
consumer at x, yx, is characterized by
Px + cyα






















Maximization problem for a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm is formal-
ized as





x − mF. (12)




∂Px =0 . From symmetry, equilibrium
condition is Px = ¯ Px ≡ Pc







If α =1 , then the unit fare is given by pc
x =2 πc/n.










In long run, the number of railway ﬁrms is determined by the free entry



























Substituting (13) and (14), the operation constraint for monopolistic
competition is
F ≤ 4α(1 + 2α)−1+α
α cG(m) ≡ ¯ Fc. (15)
6Lemma 6 ¯ Fc < ¯ FM for any α > 0.
Proof. From (11) and (15), the condition ¯ Fc < ¯ FM is equivalent to
(1 + 2α)
1+α










Deﬁne the diﬀerence function by f(t)=1+t−2t,w h e r et ≡ α/(1+α) ∈
(0,1) because α > 0. Observe that f is continuous and diﬀerentiable, and
that f(0) = f(1) = 0,a n df00 < 0. Therefore f(t) > 0 for any t ∈ (0,1).
2.4 Competition between railway ﬁrms and automobiles
Salop (1979) examines a zero-proﬁt kinked equilibrium in which the com-
parative statics results are perverse. Let us examine this phase in this sub-
section.
Proposition 7 In a zero-proﬁt kinked equilibrium, (i) the ratio of the rail-
way fare to the automobile cost is 1 − (π/n)α. (ii) If α =1 , then the unit
fare is constant at c(1 − π/n).























if Px ≤ ˆ Px.














If α =1 , then the unit fare is
































Denote the LHS of (19) by a function f(t)=t(1 − tα),w h e r et ≡
π/n ∈ (0,1).T h e m a x i m u m i s g i v e n b y f((1 + α)− 1
α)=α(1 + α)−1+α
α .
The necessary condition for the existence of the kinked equilibrium is that
α(1 + α)−1+α
α ≥ F/2cG(m), i.e.,
F ≤ 2α(1 + α)−1+α
α cG(m)= ¯ FM. (20)
If equation (20) is satisﬁed, the number of railway ﬁrms is given by
equation (19), and the fare and market share are given by (16) and (17).1
A comparative statics shows that the number of railway ﬁrms is decreas-
ing in F, and increasing in m. Thus, the fare in the symmetric zero-proﬁt
kinked equilibrium is increasing in the city size. This seems perverse, yet
intuitive explanation is as follows.
• A st h ec i t ys i z eb e c o m e sg r e a t e r ,m o r er a i l w a yﬁrms enter the market.
• The market share per ﬁrm shrinks.
• The competitor of railway ﬁr m si sn o tt h en e i g h b o r i n gﬁrms but au-
tomobiles.
• As the market shrinks, a marginal consumer comes closer to a railway
ﬁrm.
• Each railway ﬁrm can charge a higher fare.
2.5 Social optimum
A planner chooses the number of railways, n,a n df a r e s ,Px,x∈ (0,m),t o
minimize the total transportation costs under the balanced budget and the
participation constraints.
Is it optimal to allow some households to use only automobiles? In our
model the answer is no because of the assumed cost structure. The following
lemma will be useful.
Lemma 8 At the optimum, all households use the park-and-ride system.
1Equation (19) has two soltions. But the relevant solution is the larger one. To see this
suppose that the ﬁxed cost F goes to zero. By equation (19), π/n must be zero or one.
But the economically relevant soltion is zero, which corresponds to a suﬃciently large n.
8Proof. Assume that each market is segmented. As a monopoly case, a
marginal consumer is given by ¯ y =( xα − Px/c)
1
α.






(Px + cyα)dydx (21)














Px¯ ydx = mF. (23)
Substituting (23) into (21), the total transportation cost is given by





(Px + αcxα)¯ ydx.
As long as each market is segmented, i.e., ¯ y<πx/n, the planner can
reduce the sum of transportation costs by increasing n. Therefore, at the
optimum, each market must be overlapped, i.e., all households use the park-
and-ride system.
Proposition 9 At the optimum, the number of railway ﬁrms and the rail-
way fair are given by































The budget constraint is
Z m
0
2πxPxdx − mnF =0 , (25)





+ Px ≤ cxα, (26)
9for x ∈ (0,m).



















Comparing (28) with (13), the ratio is given by [2(1 + α)]
− 1
1+α.






























Comparing (29) with (14), the ratio is given by [2(1 + α)]
− 1
1+α.
Denote the ratio by a function g =[ 2 ( 1+α)]
1
1+α. Logarithmic diﬀer-
entiation gives g0/g =[ 1− ln2(1 + α)]/(1 + α)2. The ratio is increasing in
α ∈ (0,e/2 − 1), and decreasing in α ∈ (e/2 − 1,∞). Further note that
g(0) = g(1) = 2. To the extent that the marginal cost of automobile is
decreasing (α < 1), the ratio belongs to (2,e e/2).T h e o p t i m a l n u m b e r o f
railway ﬁrms is at the most a half of the monopolistically competitive one.
Besides, to the extent that the marginal cost is increasing (α > 1), the ra-
tio belongs to (1,2) and the optimal number of railway ﬁr m si sr e l a t i v e l y
large. Interestingly, within the range of α ∈ (0,e/2 − 1),t h en u m b e ro f
railway ﬁrms tends to decrease when the cost performance of automobile is
worsened.
Substituting (28) and (29) into (26), the operation constraint for the
social optimum is
F ≤ 2α(1 + α)
1
α(1 + 2α)−1+α
α cG(m) ≡ ¯ F∗. (30)
Lemma 10 ¯ F∗ R ¯ Fc if α S 1.








10The proof completes because the RHS is a decreasing function of α.
A possible commuter system depends on (i) railway cost F,( i i )a u t o m o -
bile cost α (and c), and (iii) city size m.
• In a larger city, the operation constraints are relaxed.
• If 0 < α < 1,t h e n ¯ Fc < ¯ F∗ < ¯ Fm.
• If α > 1,t h e n ¯ F∗ < ¯ Fc < ¯ Fm.
3C o n c l u s i o n
Altough the results are interesting, our model is still a prototype of urban
transportation network. Thus, there are many ways to extend the results
of this paper.
First, though lot size is ﬁxed for simplicity in this paper, endogenizing it
will provide much more ﬂavor of spatial economics as well as reality. Second,
we do not consider congestion in automobile network. Since the congestion
control by tax is important subject recently, it is better to incorporate the
congestion-related phenomena into our park-and-ride setting. Third, we
had better generalize the form of cost functions of transportation, namely
ﬁxed and marginal costs as well. Finally, while we assume a single CBD,
say monocenter, in this model, there are several CBDs in reality, e.g., Tokyo,
Paris, etc. In such multicentric cities, the eﬀects of park-and-ride might be
diﬀerent from those in monocentric city.
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